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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.1
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.1
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NtkW JERSEY. $
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.'
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA. 5
ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See Deed.
ACTION.
Building Contract -Payment conditioned on Certfficate.-Under a
building contract containing a clause that the work shall be done under
the direction and to the satisfaction of a paiticular person, to be testified
by a writing or certificate under his hand, no right to the money earned
under the contract accrues, and no action can be maintained to recover
it until the certificate is procured or the contractor is entitled to it:
Kirtland v. Moore, 40 N. J. Eq.
ASSIGNMENT.
Order on Debtor.-An order drawn by a creditor on his debtor, direct-
ing the payment of a sum of money out of a specified sum, and which
is presented to the debtor, though not accepted, constitutes a good
assignment in equity: Xirtland v. .Moore, 40 N. J. Eq.
ATTACHMENT.
Goods of Tfdrd Party Seized-Damage,.-Under an attachment of
A. against B. the officer seized goods of O. and returned an inventory and
appraisement of them. The goods were sold under an interlocutory
order of the court, and afterwards the attachment was dissolved and the
proceeds of the sale, less cost, were returned to C. He then sued the
surety in the attachment bond for damages. Held, That as he was not
a party to the suit nor estopped by his acceptance of the proceeds paid
to himh, he was not bound by the officer's return as to the amount or
value of the goods, but should recover the true value of all the. goods
actually taken, less the amount of the proceeds paid to him: ,Straub v.
Wooten, 45 Ark.
BAILMENT. See Innkeeper.
BANKRUPTCY.
New Promise--E-xemption.-A new promise to pay a debt discharged
by bankruptcy is not an original and independent contract, but revives
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term, .1885. The cases will probably appear in 116 U. S. Rep.
2 From B. D. Turner, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 45 Ark. Rep. •
S From John H. Stewart, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 40 N. J. Eq. Rep.
4 From George B. Okey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 44 Ohio St. Rep.
5 From Robert W. Shand, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 23 South Carolina Rep.
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the old debt; and where the debt was contracted under the constitution
of 1868, and the new promise was since the constitution of 1874, the
exemptions under the constitution of 1868 apply: Nowland v. Lana-
gan, 45 Ark.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Drawer-Liability of-Parol Evidence.-By the act of drawing a
bill of exchange the drawer contracts that it will be accepted and paid
according to its terms, and that if it is not he will pay it: Cummings v.
Kent, 44 Ohio St.
Evidence of a parol agreement, prior to or contemporaneous with the
drawing and delivery of a bill of exchange, that the drawer is not to be
liable as such, is inadmissible: Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
Suit between Parties out of Jurisdiction- Corporations.-In a suit
brought by stockholders of a foreign corporation against that corporation
and another corporation to which it had leased its road, lands, &c., all
of which are out of this jurisdiction, seeking relief in regard to the
transactions of those corporations with each other, the court, on demur-
rer, declined to take jurisdiction, on the ground that the courts of New
York were the proper forum for the litigation : Gregory v. N. Y., L. .
& W. Rd. Co., 40 N. J. Eq.
Suit by Legatee under Will proved in Fore gn Jurisdiction.-The
complainant claimed that, as a residuary legatee, he was entitled to a
part of a fund in defendants' hands, under what the complainant insisted
was a void bequest. Held, that as the testator was at the time of his
death a non-resident (he lived in New York, where his will was proved),
and his will had never been proved in this state, nor recorded here, as
authorized by the statute, the complainant was not entitled to relief,
although the bill states that the fund is under the control of the defend-
ants, who reside in this state and are the executors of the surviving exe-
cutor of the will by which the bequest was made: Van Gieson v.
Banta, 40 N. J. Eq.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Criminal Law.
Regulating the Bearing of Arms, &c.-Police Power.-Sections 5 and
6 of article 11 of the Military Code of Illinois, prohibiting any body of
men, other than the organized militia of the state and troops of the
United States, from parading with arms in any city of the state without
a license from the governor, do not infringe the right of the people to
bear arms, and clearly do not conflict with the 2d Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States ; that amendment being a limitation
only upon the power of Congress and the national government. It is
undoubtedly true, that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute
the reserved militia of the United States, as well as of the states, and
therefore the latter cannot prohibit the people from bearing arms, so as
to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining
public security, but such is not the effect of the legislation referred to:
Presser v. llmiois, S. C. U. S., Oct. 
Term 1885.
The right to associate as a military company and parade with arms,
not having been specially granted by an act of congress or law of the
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state, is not an attribute of national citizenship protected by the 14th
Amendment to the National Constitution : Id.
It is necessary to public peace, safety and good order, that state gov-
ernments, unless restrained by thdir own constitutions, should have the
power to control and regulate the organization, drilling and parading of
military bodies, other than those authorized by the militia laws of the
United States: 1d.
Action in one State upon Judgment obtained in another-Suit against
Joint Defendants-Evidence-Pleading -Where by the law of the state
in which a judgment has been obtained in a suit against joint defendants,
one of whom only was served with a summons, the judgment is valid
against the defendant so served, an action can be maintained thereon
against him in the courts of another state: Barley v. Donoghue, S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1885. See also Renaud v. Abbott, Id.
Whenever it becomes'necessary for a court, of one state, in order to
give full faith and credit to a judgment rendered in another state, to
ascertain the effect which it has in that state the law of that state must
be proved, like any other matter of fact; and consequently an allega-
tion in the declaration in the suit in the court of the second state, of
the effect which such .a judgment has by law in the state in which it
was rendered is admitted by demurrer: Id.
Law Impairing the Obligation of a Contract-Public Officer-Com-
pensation for Services.-When a public officer has rendered services
under a law, resolution or ordinance which fixes the rate of compensation
there arises an implied contract to pay for those services at that rate;
and a constitutional provision, passed after the services have been ren-
dered, lowering the limit of taxation under the law which was in force
while the services were performed, impairs thle obligation of this coni-
tract by destroying the remedy pro tanto : Fsk v. Jefferson Police Jury,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
Ta es for Benefit of Pvatce Individuals-Bond issued to aid Indi-
viduals in Private JEnteprises.-A large portion of the city of Charles-
ton having been laid waste by fire. the legislature authorized the city
council to issue its bonds and lend them to persons who desired to
rebuild in the burnt district. Bonds of said city, called " Fire Loan
Bonds," were accordingly issued and lent after the year 1868, and put
upon the market. Bield, that these bonds were not valid obligations of -
the city: Fehman v. City Council of Charleston, 23 S. 0.
The legislature has no power to levy taxes for the purpose of assisting
private individuals in carrying out private enterprises, even though inci-
dental advantages may result to the public: Id.
Where bonds were issued by a city to be lent "to such applicants as
will build up and rebuild the waste places and burnt districts of said
city, or erect improvements upon their lots," Held, that the bonds so
issued and lent were for private purposes, notwithstanding advantages
might incidentally accrue to the city : Id. #
This case distinguished from cases sustaining local taxation in -aid of
railroads; and also from the case of Rerudon v. Moore, 18 S. 0. 339: Id.
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COSTS.
Suit against Aldermen- Personal Liability.-Where a board of alder-
men have increased, and are continuing to increase, the debt of their
city beyond the limit fixed by statute, and citizens institute an action to
enjoin any further increase, the aldermen may be required personally to
pay the costs of the action: Scott v. Alexander, 23 S. 0.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Eztradition- Who is a Fugitive from Justice.-To be a fugitive from
jubtice, in the sense of the act of Congress regulating extradition, it is
not necessary that the party charged should have left the state in which
the crime is alleged to have been committed, after an indictment found,
or for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution anticipated or begun, but
simply that, having, within a state, committed that which, by its laws,
constitutes a crime, when le is sought to be subjected to its criminal
process to answer for his offence, he has left its jurisdiction and is found
within the territory of another: Roberts v. Reilly, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1885.
Penal Statute- Definition of Crime- Uncertainty.- The statute
making it a misdemeanor to "1 commit any act injurious to the public
health or public morals, or the perversion or obstruction of public justice,
or the due administration of the law," is unconstitutional and void for
uncertainty: Excparte Jackson, 45 Ark.
Accomplice-Evidence-Acts and Declarations.-Before the acts and
declarations of a felon can be put in evidence against an alleged accom-
plice, it must be proved to the satisfaction of the trial judge that the
two had conspired together to commit the offence charged. Rowland v.
State, 45 Ark.
The acts and declarations of one accomplice, in the absence of another,
after the deed is done and the criminal enterprise is ended, are not
admissible in evidence against the latter: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Voluntary Conveance-Purchase of Judgment with Notice.-A.,
being then indebted, made three voluntary conveyances of his land,
and afterwards judgments were obtained against him on this antecedent
indebtedness. B., with notice of these prior deeds, advanced a sum
sufficient to pay off these judgments, which were then assigned to him ;
and as further security, A. gave to B. a bond with a higher rate of
interest, and a mortgage of the land embraced in the said voluntary
conveyances. In action by B. against A. and these grantees to fore-
close such mortgage, held, that the deeds were not a fraud upon any
rights which B. was here seeking to enforce; and, therefore, whether
A. owed any other debts at the time he made the conveyances, was
irrelevant in this action ; Carrigan v. Byrd, 23 S. C.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES.
Failure to present Claim-Promise of Executor-Estoppel.-Execu-
tors' verbal statements to a creditor of the estate, that his claim was all
right, and that they would pay it as soon as they had enough money on
VOL. XXXIV.-27
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hand to do so, will not excuse such creditor's neglect to present the
claim to them formally within the time limited by the order of the court,
nor estop them from setting up the order; nor will an allegation that
they have wasted the estate, un'supported by a statement of the facts
constituting such waste, render them personally liable to a creditor of
the estate: Lewis v. CMiampion, 40 N. J. Eq.
Preference-Debts due to Public-Surety.-A debt due by a surety
at the time of his death on a.county treasurer's bond, for default of his
principal, is a " debt due to the public," and as such is entitled to pri-
ority of payment out of the- assets of one deceased: Baxter v. Baxter,
23s.c.
DFM.
Acknowledgment-I.mpeachment of.-The maker of a deed may prove
that there was no appearance before an officer to acknowledge it, and no
acknowledgment in thct, but if he did acknowledge it in some manner,
the officer's certificate is conclusive of the terms of acknowledgment:
Petty v. Grisard, 45 Ark.
EASEMENT. See .License.
EQUITY.
Agreement by Director to indemnify Co-Director-Statute of Frauds
-Remedy at Law.-The complainant, one of the eight directors of a
corporation, endorsed a promissory note for its benefit, and the proceeds
of which it received, under an oral agreement with all of his co-directors
to indemnify him from all loss resulting therefrom, except as to his own
portion, one-eighth. He was compelled to pay the note, and five of the
directors repaid him their respective shares of the amount. On demur-
rer by the other two directors to a bill to recover the amount due on
their indemnity, Held, 1. That the agreement was not within the
Statute of Frauds. 2. That the remedy at law being adequate, the bill
must be dismissed: Cortelyou v. Hoagland, 40 N. J. Eq.
Subrogation-Reformation-.Assignee of Void Security. -The assignee
of a void security, issued in lieu of a valid one, is in equity, subiogated to
all the rights of his assignor (the holder) in the original security; and
is entitled to have it delivered up to him, and if imperfect, to have it
reformed by the party that executed it, or by his successor in office:
Goldsmith v. Stewart, 45 Ark.
The plaintiff filed his complaint in equity against- the clerk of the
county and several separate boards of school directors, showing that the
holders of school warrants of their several school districts, had presented
them to the county court for cancellation and re-issue, in lursuance of
an act of the legislature, and that new warrants were issued by the court
and were transferred to him by the holders, and the originals were
'deposited with the clerk; and that the act under which the new issue
was made had been declared unconstitutional and* void by this court.
Further that the original warrants were imperfect in omitting to state
the considerations for which they were issued. He prayed that they
be delivered up to him by the clerk and be reformed by the directors of
the districts for which they had been issued by their predecessors. Beld,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
upon demurrer : 1st. That the plaintiff, as assignee of the void re-issue,
was in equity subrogated to all rights of the holders in the original cer-
tificates, and was entitled to them. 2d. The trustees who issued the
originals should be parties, and should reform then, if within reach of
the process of the court, but if not, then their successors, the defendants,
might reform or re-issue them under the directions of the court: Id.
EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See Decedents' Estates.
EXTRADITION. See Criminal Law.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OP. See Eguiy.
Promise. to pay Debt of Another-Agreement to accept Draft-New
Consideration.-An agreement by a third party, to accept for creditor
his debtor's draft. for the amount of his debt, stands upon the same foot-
ing as a promise to pay the debt, and must, under the Statute of Frauds,
be in writing, if a promise to pay the debt should be : Chapline v. Atkin-
son. 45 Ark.
A parol promise to pay the debt of another i§ not within the Statute
of Frauds when it arises from some new and original consideration of
benefit or harm moving between the newly contracting parties: Id.
HInwAYS. See Streets.
INNKEEPER.
Deposit of M1foney by one vot a Cuest-Liability.-Au innkeeper is
not liable as such for the loss of money deposited with him for safe keep-
ing by a person who is not a guest of the inn at the time such deposit is
made, or at the time the loss occurs: Arcade Hotel v. Watt, 44 Ohio
St.
The clerk of such innkeeper has no authority to bind the latter, either
as innkeeper or special bailee, for the loss of money deposited for safe
keeping with such clerk by a person who is not a guest of the inn at
the time of such deposit: d.
W., the keeper of a gambling house closed his night's business at 2
o'clock A. MI., having a sum of money upon his person; and not being
ready to retire for the night, and not wishing to carry his money upon
his person at that time of the night, visited, an inn for the purpose of
depositing his money for safe keeping; found the inn in charge of a
night clerk; inquired if he could have lodgings for the night; was tol4
that lie could ; stated that he did not desire to go to his room at that
time, but wished to leave some money with the clerk, and would return
in about half an hour. The clerk told him he would reserve a good
room for him. He did not enter his name. It was not upon any book
of the inn. No room was assigned to him. He left his package of
money with the clerk, received a check for it, and departed. He returned
in about three hours to haie a room assigned him and retire for the
balance of the morning. The clerk had absconded with the money.
Held, W. was not a guest of the inn at the tiuie lie deposited his money
with the clerk, and the innkeeper is not liable for its loss : Id.
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INSURANCE.
Representations - Warranty-Foreiture - Premium.-When a life
policy is issued and accepted upon the express condition that the answers
and statements of the application are warranted true in all respects, and
that if the policy be obtained by any untrue answer or statement, or by
any fraud, misrepresentation or concealment, " the policy shall be abso-
lutely null and void ;" and, as to matters material to the risk, some of the
answers and statements are untrue in fact, though made without actual
fraud and under an innocent misapprehension of the purport of the
questions and answers; no contract of insurance is thereby made, and
the policy does not attach but it is void ab initio : Conn. -glut. Life Ans.
Co. v. Pyle, 44 Ohio St.
When, for such a policy, premium has been paid by the applicant to
the insurance company, such payment may be recovered back: Id.
JUDGMENT. See Constitutional Law.
JUDICIAL SALE.
Purchaser under Sale subsequently set aside-Liability of-Insur-
ance.-Where parties take possession of property, purchased by them at
a sheriff's sale, under circumstances that induced a Court of Equity from
considerations of public policy, to set the sale aside, the sale cannot be
said to have been void, and the purchasers tort feasors, nor can they be
regarded like to trespassers taking possession vi et armis, but their rela-
tion to the execution debtor is like to that of trustee to cestui que trust:
Bath South Carolina Paper Co. v. Langley, 23 S. C.
Where a quasi trustee has insured property of his cestui gue trust, for
which, being burned, he receives the insurance money, he is accountable
for the amount so received, less his payments in effecting and collecting
the insurance: Id.
LICENSE. '
When Irrevocable- Contract with Railroad Company.-Where a
license is a power coupled with an interest of a permanent character, it
is irrevocable ; and if the interest be an interest in land, and the con-
tract be by parol only, the Court of Equity will hold the contract bind-
ing, where the licensee has incurred trouble and expense in carrying out
such contract: Aeetze v. Railroad Co., 23 "S. C.
Thus, where a railroad company, for certain privileges, was permitted.
by parol to construct upon the plaintiff's laud a dam, a canal, and a
water-wheel, for the purpose of keeping its tank supplied with water,
the license was irrevocable and might be enforced in equity notwith-
standing the Statute of Frauds: Id.
And this special contract being valid and therefore of force, the plain-
tiff, upon the withdrawal by the railroad company of such privileges,
could not bring action for the value of the use and occupation of the
land, but only for damages for breach of the special contract: Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Demurrer-Liability created by Statute.-Where the petition on its
face shows a cause of action which is barred by the Statute of Limita-
tions, no legal cause of action is stated, and a demurrer thereto, on the
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ground that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, raises the question of the Statute of Limitations as well
as other defects in the petition, though the better practice undoubtedly
is, to specifically state in the demurrer that the cause of action is barred:
Sey]mour v. P. C. & St. L. R. Co., 44 Ohio St.
An action against a railroad company to recover damages for killing
or injuring a domestic animal which had strayed upon its track, and
was killed or injured without'fhult or negligence of the railroad com-
pany in operating its train, but solely by the neglect to fence the road
as required by law, is founded upon -' a liability created by statute,
other Chan a forfeiture or penalty," and is barred in six years : Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Relation existing between Back Driver and H-Irer-_Negliene.-The
plaintiff while being driven in a hired hack was injured by its collision
with a railroad train, the accident being due to the concurrent negli-
gence of the hackman and the engineer, and sued the railroad com-
pany. Held. that the court below was right in leaving it to the jury to
say whether the plaintiff had exercised any control over the conduct of
the driver further than to indicate the places to which he wished him
to drive, and instructing them that, unless he did exercise such control,
and required the driver to cross .the track at the time the injury occurred,
the negligence of the driver was not imputable to him so far as to bar
his right of action against the defendant: Little v. Hfackett, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1885.
"MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Liability of Arew Corporation succeeding to Od.-Where the legisla-
ture of a state has given a local community, living within designated
boundaries, a municipal organization, and a subsequent act, or series of
acts, repeals its charter and dissolves the corporation, and incorporates
substantially the same people as a municipal body under a new name, for
the same general purpose, and the great mass of the taxable property of
the old corporation is included within the limits of the new, and the
property of the old corporation used for public purposes is transferred,
without consideration, to the new corporation for the same public uses,
the latter, notwithstanding a great reduction of iLs corporate limits, is
the successor, in law, of the former, and liable for its debts; and if any
part of the creditors of the old corporation are left without provision for
the payment of their claims, they can enforce satisfaction out of the
new: Mobile v. Watson, S. 6. U. s., Oct. Terin 1885.
NEGLIGENCE.
Proximate Cause-Fire.-Whee fire is negligently thrown from a
mill smoke-stack and carried to a building outside the mill property, and
thence to another building of a third party, and thence to other pro-
perty that is damaged by'the fire ; whether such negligence is the proxi-
mate cause of such datnage, is a question of fhct for the determination
or' the jury under the instructions of the court: Adams v. Young, 44
Ohio St.
In an action against a mill owner for damages to property caused by
fire negligently or carelessly thrown by sparkb frot the snoke stack of
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the mill and carried to the property by a gale of wind blowing at the
time in the direction of the property, by which fire the same was dam-
aged; where the conditions continue the same as when the negligent
and careless act was done, and no new cause intervenes, it is no defence
that the fire first burned an intervening building and was then'ie com-
municated by sparks and cinders in the same manner to the building in
which such fire consumed the property; though the buildings were
separated by a space of two hundred feet: Id.
NOTICE.
Possession.-Without proof of notice, either actual or constructive, an
unregistered title is void, and of no effect against a subsequent judg-
ment creditor of its grantor: Executors of Ilodge v. Amerman. 40
N. J. Eq.
The burden of proving notice in such a. case rests on the holder of
the unregistered title : Id.
Constructive notice of an unregistered title is just as effectual as actual
notice: Id.
Possession, if open, notorious, exclusive and unequivocal, will con-
stitute notice, and such possession may exi.t without actual residence on
the land: Id.
It is not necessary, in order to prove notice, to show that the person
to be effected by the notice knew of the possession of the other. If the
possession of the other is of such a character as to constitute notice, then
notice is a legal deduction from the fact of possession: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
Account as to Funds resulting from illegal Transaction.-Where one
partner was township treasurer and with the knowledge of his co.partner
deposited the township funds in the bank to the firm credit, Held, that
this was a conversion of the public moneys ; that both partners were
particeps criminis, and that as to such funds the law will aid neither
party against the other, either in the way of account, contribution or
otherwise: Davis v. Gelhaus, 44 Ohio St.
PROHIBITION.
When a Defendant is entitled to a Writ of, as a Matter of Right-A
Common-Law Wrt.-Where an inferior court has clearly no jurisdic-
tion of a suit or prosecution instituted before it, and the defendant therein
has objected to its jurisdiction at the outset, and has no other remedy,
he is entitled to a writ of prohibition as a matter of right; and a refusal
to grant it, where all the proceedings appear of record may be reviewed
on error: Amith v. Whitney, S. C. 'L. S., Oct. Term 1885.
. It seems, that a writ of prohibition issues from the law side of a court
which has both common-law and equity powers: Id.
SALE.
Rescission-Fraud of "Purchaser-Ratification.-If a vendor of goods
after being advised of the fraud of the purchaser in obtaining credit by
misrepresenting his ability to pay, accepts further security instead of
demanding a rescission of the contract and a return of the goods. he
thereby ratifies the contract and cannot afterwards demand a rescission:
Bridgeford v. Adams, 45 Ark.
